# Computational Advertising

## Greedy Algorithms
## Competitive Algorithms
## Picking the Best Ad
## The Balance Algorithm

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# Online Algorithms

- Classic model of (*offline*) algorithms:
  - You get to see the entire input, then compute some function of it.
- *Online algorithm*:
  - You get to see the input one piece at a time, and need to make irrevocable decisions along the way.
  - Similar to data stream models.

# Example: Bipartite Matching




- Two sets of nodes.
- Some edges between them.
- Maximize the number of nodes paired 1-1 by edges.

# Bipartite Matching – (2)




M = {(1,a),(2,b),(3,d)} is a *matching* of cardinality |M| = 3.

# Bipartite Matching – (3)




M = {(1,c),(2,b),(3,d),(4,a)} is a *perfect matching* (all nodes matched).

# Matching Algorithm

- Problem: Find a maximum-cardinality matching for a given bipartite graph.
  - A perfect one if it exists.
- There is a polynomial-time offline algorithm (Hopcroft and Karp 1973).
- But what if we don't have the entire graph initially?

# Online Matching

- Initially, we are given the set of men.
- In each round, one woman's set of choices is revealed.
- At that time, we have to decide either to:
  - Pair the woman with a man.
  - Don't pair the woman with any man.
- Example applications: assigning tasks to servers or Web requests to threads.

# Online Matching – (2)




(1,a)

(2,b)

(3,d)

# Greedy Algorithm

- Pair the new woman with any eligible man.
  - If there is none, don't pair the woman.
- How good is the algorithm?

# Competitive Ratio

- For input I, suppose greedy produces matching $M_{greedy}$ while an optimal matching is $M_{opt}$.

*Competitive ratio* =

$$\min_{\text{all possible inputs I}} (|M_{greedy}|/|M_{opt}|).$$

# Greedy Has Competitive Ratio 1/2

- Let O be the optimal matching, and G the matches produced by a run of the greedy algorithm.
- Consider the sets of women:

  A: Matched in G, not in O.

  B: Matched in both.

  C: Matched in O, not in G.

# Proof of Competitive Ratio 1/2




- During the greedy matching, every woman in C found her match in the optimal solution taken by another woman.
- Thus, $|A| + |B| \geq |C|$.
- Surely, $|A| + |B| \geq |B|$.
- Thus, $|G| = |A| + |B| \geq (|B| + |C|)/2 = |O|/2$.

If you're greater than each of two things, you are greater than their average.

# Worst-Case Scenario




(1,a)

(2,b)

|Greedy| = 2;

|Opt| = 4.

# History of Web Advertising

- Banner ads (1995-2001).
  - Initial form of web advertising.
  - Popular websites charged X$ for every 1000 “impressions” of ad.
    - Called “CPM” rate.
    - Modeled on TV, magazine ads.
  - Untargeted to demographically targeted.
  - Low clickthrough rates.
    - low ROI for advertisers.

# Performance-Based Advertising

- Introduced by Overture around 2000.
  - Advertisers “bid” on search keywords.
  - When someone searches for that keyword, the highest bidder’s ad is shown.
  - Advertiser is charged only if the ad is clicked on.
- Similar model adopted by Google with some changes around 2002.
  - Called “Adwords.”

# Web 2.0

- Performance-based advertising works!
  - Multi-billion-dollar industry.
- Interesting problems:
  - What ads to show for a search?
  - If I'm an advertiser, which search terms should I bid on and how much should I bid?

# Adwords Problem

- A stream of queries arrives at the search engine
  - q1, q2,…
- Several advertisers bid on each query.
- When query $q_i$ arrives, search engine must pick a subset of advertisers whose ads are shown.
- Goal: maximize search engine's revenues.
- Clearly we need an online algorithm!
- Simplest online algorithm is Greedy.

# Complications – (1)

- Each ad has a different likelihood of being clicked.
- Example:
  - Advertiser 1 bids $2, click probability = 0.1.
  - Advertiser 2 bids $1, click probability = 0.5.
    - Click-through rate measured by historical performance.
- Simple solution:
  - Instead of raw bids, use the “expected revenue per click.”

# The Adwords Innovation

| Advertiser | Bid | CTR | Bid * CTR |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | $1.00 | 1% | 1 cent |
| B | $0.75 | 2% | 1.5 cents |
| C | $0.50 | 2.5% | 1.125 cents |

# The Adwords Innovation

| Advertiser | Bid | CTR | Bid * CTR |
|---|---|---|---|
| B | $0.75 | 2% | 1.5 cents |
| C | $0.50 | 2.5% | 1.125 cents |
| A | $1.00 | 1% | 1 cent |

# Complications – (2)

- Each advertiser has a limited budget
  - Search engine guarantees that the advertiser will not be charged more than their daily budget.

# Simplified Model

- Assume all bids are 0 or 1.
- Each advertiser has the same budget B.
- One advertiser is chosen per query.
- Let's try the greedy algorithm:
  - Arbitrarily pick an eligible advertiser for each keyword.

# Bad Scenario For Greedy

- Two advertisers A and B.
- A bids on query x, B bids on x and y.
- Both have budgets of $4.
- Query stream: x x x x y y y y.
- Possible greedy choice: B B B B _ _ _ _.
- Optimal: A A A A B B B B.
- Competitive ratio = 1/2.
  - This is actually the worst case.

# Balance Algorithm [MSVV]

- [Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani, and Vazirani].
- For each query, pick the advertiser with the largest unspent budget who bid on this query.
  - Break ties arbitrarily.

# Example: Balance

- Two advertisers A and B.
- A bids on query x, B bids on x and y.
- Both have budgets of $4.
- Query stream: x x x x y y y y.
- Balance choice: B A B A B B _ _.
- Optimal: A A A A B B B B.
- Competitive ratio = 3/4.

# Analyzing Balance

- Consider simple case: two advertisers, $A_1$ and $A_2$, each with budget B > 1, an even number.
- We'll consider the case where the optimal solution exhausts both advertisers' budgets.
  - I.e., optimal revenue to search engine = 2B.
- Balance must exhaust at least one advertiser's budget.
  - If not, we can allocate more queries.
  - Assume Balance exhausts $A_2$'s budget.

# Analyzing Balance




Queries allocated to $A_1$ in optimal solution

Queries allocated to $A_2$ in optimal solution

Opt revenue = 2B
Balance revenue = 2B-x = B+y




Balance allocation

Note: only green queries can be assigned to neither.
A blue query could have been assigned to $A_1$.

We claim $y \geq x$ (next slide).
Balance revenue is minimum for x=y=B/2.
Minimum Balance revenue = 3B/2.
Competitive Ratio = 3/4.

# Analyzing Balance: Two Cases




- Case 1: At least half the blue queries are assigned to $A_1$ by Balance.
  - Then $y \geq B/2$, since the blues alone are $\geq B/2$.
- Case 2: Fewer than half the blue queries are assigned to $A_1$ by Balance.
  - Let q be the last blue query assigned by Balance to $A_2$.




Balance allocation

# Analyzing Balance – (3)







Balance allocation

- Since $A_1$ obviously bid on q, at that time, the budget of $A_2$ must have been at least as great as that of $A_1$.
- Since more than half the blue queries are assigned to $A_2$, at the time of q, $A_2$'s remaining budget was at most B/2.
- Therefore so was $A_1$'s, which implies $x \leq B/2$, and therefore $y \geq B/2$ and $y \geq x$.
- Thus Balance assigns $\geq 3B/2$.

# General Result

- In the general case, competitive ratio of Balance is 1–1/e = approx. 0.63.
- Interestingly, no online algorithm has a better competitive ratio.
- Won't go through the details here, but let's see the worst case that gives this ratio.

# Worst Case for Balance

- N advertisers, each with budget B >> N >> 1.
- N*B queries appear in N rounds.
- Each round consists of a single query repeated B times.
- Round 1 queries: bidders $A_1$, $A_2$,…, $A_N$.
- Round 2 queries: bidders $A_2$, $A_3$,…, $A_N$,…
- Round i queries: bidders $A_i$,…, $A_N$,…
- Round N queries: only $A_N$ bids.
- Optimum allocation: round i queries to $A_i$.
  - Optimum revenue N*B.

# Pattern to Remember

- After i rounds, the first i advertisers have dropped out of the bidding.
  - Why? All subsequent queries are ones they do not bid on.
- Thus, they never get any more queries, even though they have budget left.

# Balance Allocation




After k rounds, sum of allocations to each of $A_k,\ldots,A_N$ is $S_k = S_{k+1} = \ldots = S_N = \sum_{1 \le i \le k} B/(N-i+1)$.

If we find the smallest k such that $S_k \ge B$, then after k rounds we cannot allocate any queries to any advertiser.

# BALANCE Analysis

B/1 B/2 B/3 … B/(N-k+1) … B/(N-1) B/N

Each width represents the amount of budget spent by $A_k$ after k rounds.




Or in terms of fractions (dividing by B):

1/1 1/2 1/3 … 1/(N-k+1) … 1/(N-1) 1/N



# BALANCE analysis

- Fact: $H_n = \sum_{1 \le i \le n} 1/i \sim= \log_e(n)$ for large n.
  - Result due to Euler.




$S_k = 1$ implies $H_{N-k} = \log(N) - 1 = \log(N/e)$.
N-k = N/e [Why? $\log(N-k) = H_{N-k} = \log(N/e)$].
k = N(1-1/e) ~= 0.63N.

Euler Line above

# Balance Analysis

- So after the first N(1-1/e) rounds, we cannot allocate a query to any advertiser.
- Revenue = BN(1-1/e).
- Competitive ratio = 1-1/e.

# General Version of Problem

- Arbitrary bids, budgets.
- Balance can be terrible.
- Example: Consider two advertisers $A_1$ and $A_2$, each bidding on query q.
  - $A_1$: $x_1 = 1$, $b_1 = 110$.
  - $A_2$: $x_2 = 10$, $b_2 = 100$.

Bids

Budgets

- First 10 occurrences of q all go to $A_1$, and $A_1$ then gets 10 q's for every one that $A_2$ gets.
  - What if there are only 10 occurrences of q?
    - Opt yields \$100; Balance yields \$10.

# Generalized Balance

- Arbitrary bids; consider query q, bidder i.
  - Bid = $x_i$.
  - Budget = $b_i$.
  - Amount spent so far = $m_i$.
  - Fraction of budget remaining $f_i = 1-m_i/b_i$.
- Define $\psi_i(q) = x_i(1-e^{-f_i})$.
- Allocate query q to bidder i with largest value of $\psi_i(q)$.
- Same competitive ratio (1-1/e).