# Stanford CS224W: Advanced Topics in Graph Neural Networks



### **UPCOMING EXAM**

#### • Exam coming up next Tuesday 3/7

- Make-up exam on Sunday 3/5
- Administered on Gradescope: open-book, take-home
- Exam is open for 24 hours, you can take it in any 2-hour window
- If you need an extension (OAE), please request it now!


#### Resources for exam prep:

- Practice exam released by midnight tonight
- Review session tomorrow, Wednesday 2-4pm on Zoom (Highly recommended!) We will cover exam topics, format, and studying tips; review key concepts, etc.
- Don't stress! Exam will be curved. HW/Colab grades so far show that people are doing great!




### **Course improvements**

- Thank you for the feedback!
- EdStem response rate
  - Previously response rate was around ~95%
  - Re-designed our workflow to ensure no message falls through the cracks
  - 100% of messages have now been responded to
  - Moving forward, you should expect to receive a response in < 12 hours




### **Course improvements**

- Thank you for the feedback!
- Releasing homework and Colab solutions
  - We really appreciate the feedback from many students that these will be helpful. We hear you and have changed our policy.
  - Please do not share these as it would mean an Honor Code violation




J. You, R. Ying, J. Leskovec. Design Space of Graph Neural Networks, NeurIPS 2020C

### **Recap: A General GNN Framework**



Jure Leskovec, Stanford CS224W: Machine Learning with Graphs, http://cs224w.stanford.edu

### **Recap: GNN Training Pipeline**




## **Today's lecture:** Can we make GNN representation more expressive?

# Stanford CS224W: Limitations of Graph Neural Networks



### A "Perfect" GNN Model

- A thought experiment: What should a perfect GNN do?
  - A k-layer GNN embeds a node based on the K-hop neighborhood structure




 A perfect GNN should build an injective function between neighborhood structure (regardless of hops) and node embeddings


### A "Perfect" GNN Model

#### Therefore, for a perfect GNN:

Observation 1: If two nodes have the same neighborhood structure, they must have the same embedding




 Observation 2: If two nodes have different neighborhood structure, they must have different embeddings



## Imperfections of Existing GNNs

- However, Observations 1 & 2 are imperfect
  Observation 1 could have issues:
  - Even though two nodes may have the same neighborhood structure, we may want to assign different embeddings to them
  - Because these nodes appear in different positions in the graph
  - We call these tasks Position-aware tasks
  - Even a perfect GNN will fail for these tasks:






NYC road network

J. You, J. Gomes-Selman, R. Ying, J. Leskovec. Identity-aware Graph Neural Networks, AAAI 2021

### Imperfections of Existing GNNs

- Observation 2 often cannot be satisfied:
  - The GNNs we have introduced so far are not perfect
  - In Lecture 9, we discussed that their expressive power is upper bounded by the WL test
  - For example, message passing GNNs cannot count the cycle length:




### **Plan for the Lecture**

- We will resolve both issues by building more expressive GNNs
- Fix issues in Observation 1:
  - Create node embeddings based on their positions in the graph
  - Example method: Position-aware GNNs
- Fix issues in Observation 2:
  - Build message passing GNNs that are more expressive than WL test
  - Example method: Identity-aware GNNs

### **Our Approach**

#### We use the following thinking:


- Two different inputs (nodes, edges, graphs) are labeled differently
- A "failed" model will always assign the same embedding to them
- A "successful" model will assign different embeddings to them
- Embeddings are determined by GNN computational graphs:



#### **Two inputs**: nodes $v_1$ and $v_2$ **Different labels:** A and B **Goal:** assign different embeddings to $v_1$ and $v_2$


### **Naïve Solution is not Desirable**

- A naïve solution: One-hot encoding
  - Encode each node with a different ID, then we can always differentiate different nodes/edges/graphs



### **Naïve Solution is not Desirable**

- A naïve solution: One-hot encoding
  - Encode each node with a different ID, then we can always differentiate different nodes/edges/graphs



#### Issues:

- Not scalable: Need O(N) feature dimensions (N is the number of nodes)
- Not inductive: Cannot generalize to new nodes/graphs


# Stanford CS224W: Position-aware Graph Neural Networks



### **Two Types of Tasks on Graphs**


#### There are two types of tasks on graphs

#### Structure-aware task



 Nodes are labeled by their structural roles in the graph

**Position-aware task** 




 Nodes are labeled by their **positions** in the graph

### **Structure-aware Tasks**

#### GNNs often work well for structure-aware tasks

#### Structure-aware task




- GNNs work 🙂
- Can differentiate v<sub>1</sub> and
   v<sub>2</sub> by using different
   computational graphs

. . .

### **Position-aware Tasks**


# GNNs will always fail for position-aware tasks




- GNNs fail 😕
- $v_1$  and  $v_2$  will always have the same
  - computational graph,
- due to structure symmetry
- Can we define deep learning methods that are position-aware?

### **Power of "Anchor"**

- Randomly pick a node s<sub>1</sub> as an anchor node
- Represent v<sub>1</sub> and v<sub>2</sub> via their relative distances w.r.t. the anchor s<sub>1</sub>, which are different
- An anchor node serves as a coordinate axis
  - Which can be used to locate nodes in the graph




Relative Distances



### **Power of "Anchors"**


- Pick more nodes s<sub>1</sub>, s<sub>2</sub> as anchor nodes
- **Observation:** More anchors can better characterize node position in different regions of the graph
- Many anchors –> Many coordinate axes




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### **Power of "Anchor-sets"**

- Generalize anchor from a single node to a set of nodes
  - We define distance to an anchor-set as the minimum distance to all the nodes in the ancho-set
- Observation: Large anchor-sets can sometimes provide more precise position estimate
  - We can save the total number of anchors



**Relative Distances** 



Anchor  $s_1$ ,  $s_2$  cannot differentiate node  $v_1$ ,  $v_3$ , but anchor-set  $s_3$  can

- - For every node pairs  $u, v \in V$ , the Euclidian embedding distance  $||z_u - z_v||_2$  is close to the original distance metric d(u, v).

### **Anchor Set: Theory**

- Bourgain Theorem [Informal] [Bourgain 1985]
  - Consider the following embedding function of node  $v \in V$ .  $f(v) = (d_{\min}(v, S_{1,1}), d_{\min}(v, S_{1,2}), ..., d_{\min}(v, S_{\log n, c\log n})) \in \mathbb{R}^{c \log^2 n}$

where

- *c* is a constant.
- $S_{i,j} \subset V$  is chosen by including each node in V independently with probability  $\frac{1}{2^{i}}$ .

• 
$$d_{\min}(v, S_{i,j}) \equiv \min_{u \in S_{i,j}} d(v, u).$$

The embedding distance produced by f is provably close to the original distance metric (V, d).

### **Anchor Set: Theory**

#### P-GNN follows the theory of Bourgain theorem

- First samples  $O(\log^2 n)$  anchor sets  $S_{i,j}$ .
- Embed each node v via


 $\left(d_{\min}(v, S_{1,1}), d_{\min}(v, S_{1,2}), \dots, d_{\min}(v, S_{\log n, c\log n})\right) \in \mathbb{R}^{c \log^2 n}.$ 

#### P-GNN maintains the inductive capability

- During training, new anchor sets are *re-sampled* every time.
- P-GNN is learned to operate over the new anchor sets.
- At test time, given a new unseen graph, new anchor sets are sampled.
   Jure Leskovec, Stanford CS224W: Machine Learning with Graphs

### **Position Information: Summary**

- Position encoding for graphs: Represent a node's position by its distance to randomly selected anchor-sets
  - Each dimension of the position encoding is tied to an anchor-set




### **How to Use Position Information**


- The simple way: Use position encoding as an augmented node feature (works well in practice)
  - Issue: Since each dimension of position encoding is tied to a random anchor set, dimensions of positional encoding can be randomly permuted, without changing its meaning
  - Imagine you permute the input dimensions of a normal NN, the output will surely change

### **How to Use Position Information**

- The rigorous solution: Requires a special NN that can maintain the permutation invariant property of position encoding
  - Permuting the input feature dimension will only result in the permutation of the output dimension, the value in each dimension won't change
  - Position-aware GNN paper has more details



# Stanford CS224W: Identity-Aware Graph Neural Networks



J. You, J. Gomes-Selman, R. Ying, J. Leskovec. Identity-aware Graph Neural Networks, AAAI 2021


### **More Failure Cases for GNNs**


- We learned that GNNs would fail for position-aware tasks
- But can GNN perform perfectly in structureaware tasks?
  - Unfortunately, NO.
- GNNs exhibit three levels of failure cases in structure-aware tasks:
  - Node level
  - Edge level
  - Graph level


### GNN Failure 1: Node-level Tasks

Different Inputs but the same computational graph  $\rightarrow$  GNN fails

Example input graphs








### GNN Failure 2: Edge-level Tasks


Different Inputs but the same computational graph  $\rightarrow$  GNN fails

Example input graphs




Edge A and B share node  $v_0$ We look at embeddings for  $v_1$  and  $v_2$ 

Existing GNNs' computational graphs




### **GNN Failure 3: Graph-level Tasks**

#### Different Inputs but the same computational graph $\rightarrow$ GNN fails



### Idea: Inductive Node Coloring


# Idea: We can assign a color to the node we want to embed



### Idea: Inductive Node Coloring


#### This coloring is inductive:

It is invariant to node ordering/identities




Jure Leskovec, Stanford CS224W: Machine Learning with Graphs

### Inductive Node Coloring – Node level



#### Inductive Node Coloring – Graph Level

#### Inductive node coloring can help graph classification




Jure Leskovec, Stanford CS224W: Machine Learning with Graphs


#### Inductive Node Coloring – Edge Level

#### Inductive node coloring can help link prediction

Link prediction

Example input graphs





ID-GNNs' computational graphs

#### Two types of nodes:



node with augmented identity

node without augmented identity

#### An edge-level task involves classifying a pair of nodes:

- **1**. We color one of the node  $(v_0)$
- 2. We then embed the other node in the node pair ( $v_1$  or  $v_2$ )
- 3. We use the node embedding for  $v_1$  or  $v_2$  conditioned on  $v_0$  being colored or not to make edge-level prediction


Different computational graphs  $\rightarrow$  Successfully differentiate edges

#### Inductive Node Coloring – Edge Level

#### Inductive node coloring can help link prediction

Link prediction

Example input graphs



 $\neq$ computational

#### An edge-level task involves classifying a pair of nodes:

- **1**. We color one of the node  $(v_0)$
- 2. We then embed the other node in the node pair ( $v_1$  or  $v_2$ )
- 3. We use the node embedding for  $v_1$  or  $v_2$  conditioned on  $v_0$  being colored or not to make edge-level prediction

#### Different


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#### How to build a GNN using node coloring? Two

ID-GNNs'

graphs


- Utilize inductive node coloring in embedding computation
  - Idea: Heterogenous message passing
    - Normally, a GNN applies the same message/aggregation computation to all the nodes



**GNN:** At a given layer, we apply the same message/aggregation to each node

- Idea: Heterogenous message passing
  - Heterogenous: different types of message passing is applied to different nodes
  - An ID-GNN applies different message/aggregation to nodes with different colorings

Message





- **Output**: Node embedding  $\boldsymbol{h}_{v}^{(K)}$  for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$ .
- Step 1: Extract the ego-network
  - $\mathcal{G}_{v}^{(K)}$ : *K*-hop neighborhood graph around v
  - Set the initial node feature
    - For  $u \in \mathcal{G}_v^{(K)}$ ,  $\boldsymbol{h}_u^{(0)} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{x}_u$  (input node feature)


Step 2: Heterogeneous message passing

For 
$$k = 1, ..., K$$
 do
For  $u \in \mathcal{G}_{v}^{(K)}$  do
 $h_{u}^{(k)} \leftarrow AGG^{(k)} \left( \left\{ \mathsf{MSG}_{1[s=v]}^{(k)} \left( h_{s}^{(k-1)} \right), s \in N(u) \right\}, h_{u}^{(k-1)} \right) \right)$ 


Depending on whether s = v (s is the center node v) or not, we use different neural network functions to transform  $h_s^{(k-1)}$ .

Why does heterogenous message passing work:

- Suppose two nodes v<sub>1</sub>, v<sub>2</sub> have the same computational graph structure, but have different node colorings
- Since we will apply different neural network for embedding computation, their embeddings will be different




### **GNN vs ID-GNN**



- Why does ID-GNN work better than GNN?
- Intuition: ID-GNN can count cycles originating from a given node, but GNN cannot

### **Simplified Version: ID-GNN-Fast**



- Based on the intuition, we propose a simplified version
   ID-GNN-Fast
  - Include identity information as an augmented node feature (no need to do heterogenous message passing)
  - Use cycle counts in each layer as an augmented node feature. Also can be used together with any GNN

- Summary of ID-GNN: A general and powerful extension to GNN framework
  - We can apply ID-GNN on any message passing GNNs (GCN, GraphSAGE, GIN, ...)
    - ID-GNN provides consistent performance gain in node/edge/graph level tasks
  - ID-GNN is more expressive than their GNN counterparts. ID-GNN is the first message passing GNN that is more expressive than 1-WL test
  - We can easily implement ID-GNN using popular GNN tools (PyG, DGL, ...)

# Stanford CS224W: Robustness of Graph Neural Networks

CS224W: Machine Learning with Graphs Jure Leskovec, Stanford University http://cs224w.stanford.edu



## **Deep Learning Performance**

- Recent years have seen impressive performance of deep learning models in a variety of applications.
  - Example: In computer vision, deep convolutional networks have achieved human-level performance on ImageNet (image category classification)
- Are these models ready to be deployed in real world?

## **Adversarial Examples**

- Deep convolutional neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks:
  - Imperceptible noise changes the prediction.



Adversarial examples are also reported in natural language processing [Jia & Liang et al. EMNLP 2017] and audio processing [Carlini et al. 2018] domains.

## Implication of Adversarial Examples

- The existence of adversarial examples prevents the reliable deployment of deep learning models to the real world.
  - Adversaries may try to actively hack the deep learning models.
  - The model performance can become much worse than we expect.

Deep learning models are often not robust.

 In fact, it is an active area of research to make these models robust against adversarial examples Zügner et al. Adversarial Attacks on Neural Networks for Graph Data, KDD 2018


## **Robustness of GNNs**

- How about GNNs? Are they robust to adversarial examples?
- Premise: Common applications of GNNs involve public platforms and monetary interests.
  - Recommender systems
  - Social networks
  - Search engines

 Adversaries have the incentive to manipulate input graphs and hack GNNs' predictions.

#### Setting to Study GNNs' Robustness

- To study the robustness of GNNs, we specifically consider the following setting:
  - Task: Semi-supervised node classification
  - Model: GCN [Kipf & Welling ICLR 2017]
  - ?: Unlabeled




## Roadmap

- We first describe several real-world adversarial attack possibilities.
- We then review the GCN model that we are going to attack (knowing the opponent).
- We mathematically formalize the attack problem as an optimization problem.
- We empirically see how vulnerable GCN's prediction is to the adversarial attack.

#### **Attack Possibilities**

- What are the attack possibilities in real world?
  - Target node  $t \in V$ : node whose label prediction we want to change
  - Attacker nodes S ⊂ V: nodes the attacker can modify





- Direct Attack: Attacker node is the target node:  $S = \{t\}$
- Modify target node feature
  - Ex) Change website content
- Add connections to target
  - Ex) Buy likes/followers


Remove connections from target

Jure Leskovec, Stanford CS224W: Machine Learning with Graphs

Ex) Unfollow users









#### **Attack Possibilities: Indirect Attack**

- Indirect Attack: The target node is not in the attacker nodes: *t* ∉ *S*
- Modify attacker node features
  - Ex) Hijack friends of targets
- Add connections to attackers
  - Ex) Create a link, link farm






Remove connections from attackers
 Ex) Delete undesirable link

### **Formalizing Adversarial Attacks**

#### Objective for the attacker:

Maximize (change of target node label prediction) Subject to (graph manipulation is small)

> If graph manipulation is too large, it will easily be detected. Successful attacks should change the target prediction with "unnoticeably-small" graph manipulation.



## Mathematical Formulation (1)

#### Original graph:

- A: adjacency matrix, X: feature matrix
- Manipulated graph (after adding noise):
  - A': adjacency matrix, X': feature matrix
- Assumption:  $(A', X') \approx (A, X)$ 
  - Graph manipulation is unnoticeably small.
    - Preserving basic graph statistics (e.g,. degree distribution) and feature statistics.
  - Graph manipulation is either direct (changing the feature/connection of target nodes) or indirect.

## Mathematical Formulation (2)

#### Overview of the attack framework

- Original adjacency matrix A, node features X, node labels Y.
- θ\*: Model parameter learned over A, X, Y.
   c<sup>\*</sup><sub>v</sub>: class label of node v predicted by GCN with θ\*
- An attacker has access to A, X, Y, and the learning algorithm.
- The attacker modifies (A, X) into (A', X').
- $\theta^{*'}$ : Model parameter learned over A', X', Y.
  - $c_v^{*\prime}$ : class label of node v predicted by GCN with  $\theta^{*\prime}$
- The goal of the attacker is to make  $c_v^{*\prime} \neq c_v^*$ .

### Mathematical Formulation (3)

- Target node:  $v \in V$
- GCN learned over the **original graph**  $\boldsymbol{\theta}^* = \operatorname{argmin}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathcal{L}_{train}(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \boldsymbol{A}, \boldsymbol{X})$
- GCN's original prediction on the target node:  $c_v^* = \operatorname{argmax}_c f_{\theta^*}(A, X)_{v,c}$

Predict the class  $c_v^*$  of vertex v that has the highest predicted probability

## Mathematical Formulation (4)

- GCN learned over the manipulated graph  $\theta^{*'} = \operatorname{argmin}_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{train}(\theta; A', X')$
- GCN's prediction on the target node v:  $c_{v}^{*'} = \operatorname{argmax}_{c} f_{\theta^{*'}}(A', X')_{v,c}$
- We want the prediction to change after the graph is manipulated:

 $C_v^{*\prime} \neq C_v^*$ 

### Mathematical Formulation (5)

• Change of prediction on target node v:  $\Delta(v; A', X') = \log f_{\theta^{*'}}(A', X')_{v, c_v^{*'}} - \log f_{\theta^{*'}}(A', X')_{v, c_v^{*}}$ 

> Predicted (log) probability of the newly-predicted class  $c_v^{*'}$



Predicted (log) probability of the originally-predicted class  $c_v^*$ 



## **Mathematical Formulation (6)**

#### Final optimization objective:

 $\operatorname{argmax}_{A',X'} \Delta(\nu; A', X')$ subject to  $(A', X') \approx (A, X)$ 

#### Challenges in optimizing the objective

- Adjacency matrix A' is a discrete object
- For every modified graph A' and X', GCN needs to be retrained:  $\theta^{*'} = \operatorname{argmin}_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{train}(\theta; A', X')$

#### **Solution** [Zügner et al. KDD2018]:


- Iteratively follow a locally optimal strategy:
  - Sequentially 'manipulate' the most promising element: an entry from the adjacency matrix or a feature entry
  - Pick the one which obtains the highest difference in the logprobabilites, indicated by the score function.

## **Experiments: Setting**

- Setting: Semi-supervised node classification with GCN
- Graph: Paper citation network (2,800 nodes, 8,000 edges).
- Attack type: Edge modification (addition or deletion of edges)
- Attack budget on node v: d<sub>v</sub> + 2 modifications
   (d<sub>v</sub>: degree of node v).
  - Intuition: It is harder to attack a node with a larger degree.
- Model is trained and attacked 5 times using different random seeds.

#### **Experiments: Adversarial Attack**

Predicted probabilities of a target node v over 5 retrainings (each bar represents a single trial) (without graph manipulation, i.e., clean graph)



#### **Classification margin**


- > 0: Correct classification
- < 0: Incorrect classification

#### 7-class classification

### **Experiments: Adversarial Attack**

# GCN's prediction after modifying 5 edges attached to the target node (direct adversarial attack).

Predicted probabilities over 5 re-trainings (with adversarial attacks)




### **Experiments: Attack Comparison**

#### Adversarial direct attack

is the strongest attack, significantly worsening GCN's performance (compared to **no attack**).

- Random attack is much weaker than adversarial attack.
- Indirect attack is more challenging than direct attack.

Each dot indicates one attack trial.



### Summary

- We study the adversarial robustness of GCN applied to semi-supervised node classification.
- We consider different attack possibilities on graph-structured data.
- We mathematically formulate the adversarial attack as an optimization problem.
- We empirically demonstrate that GCN's prediction performance can be significantly harmed by adversarial attacks.
- GCN is not robust to adversarial attacks but it is somewhat robust to indirect attacks and random noise.